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Abstract This paper shows that it is possible to track the changes in the dis-
tribution of power within a couple by focusing on the changes in the pattern of
private consumption when the consumption decisions are ecient and private con-
sumption is separable from public consumption in individual preferences. We rst
show that the separability of private consumption from public consumption at
the individual level carries over to the household level. Hence, changes in public
consumption only matters through a change in the residual budget available for
private consumption. When the consumption decisions within the household is ef-
cient, private consumption decisions can be modeled as the solution of a problem
consisting in maximizing a weighted sum of the private-consumption sub-utility
functions of the spouses under the residual budget, the weights being unique and
representing the distribution of power over the allocation of private consumption.
The model presented in this paper can be used to analyze the changes in the
household resource allocation due to, for example, childbirth.
Keywords Collective model  Intra-household resource allocation  Bargaining 
Separability.
JEL classication codes: C78 D01 D11
1 Introduction
Collective models of households with heterogeneous preferences among members
have become a standard framework for analyzing household behavior. This is in
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part because a number of empirical studies have rejected the traditional unitary
household model (e.g., Thomas (1990) and Lundberg, Pollak, and Wales (1997)).
The theoretical development of the Pareto ecient approach to collective house-
hold models following the seminal papers by Chiappori (1988, 1992) has also en-
abled us to test the collective rationality under a set of fairly weak assumptions
(e.g., Browning and Chiappori (1998)) and the collective rationality has not been
rejected in some countries, including Canada (Browning and Chiappori, 1998) and
Mexico (Bobonis, 2009).1 Blundell, Chiappori, and Meghir (2005) advanced the
Pareto-ecient approach to households with children. They show that the shar-
ing rule can be identied in the presence of either separability or one distribution
factor.
In this note, we discuss the relationship between the Pareto-optimal allocation
in the household and the allocation of private goods in the corresponding private
sub-problem. We rst show that the weak separability of private goods consump-
tion from public goods consumption carries over to the household level. We then
show the existence of a private sub-problem that supports the allocation of private
goods in any Pareto-ecient outcome. We also provide a necessary and sucient
condition for the household Pareto weight and the Pareto weight in the private
sub-problem to move in the same direction. When this condition is satised, we
can focus on the space of private goods to track the changes in the overall decision
power and resource allocation within a household.
The results presented in this note are directly applicable to the identication
of changes in the resource allocation within a household. Using the analytical
framework developed in this note, Fujii and Ishikawa (2012) estimate the impact
of childbirth on intra-household allocation using the Japanese Panel Survey of
Consumers (JPSC) dataset, which includes the measurements of consumption ex-
penditure for the husband, wife, children, other household members and family as
a whole. They nd that the private goods allocation tends to move towards the
wife's disadvantage when a new baby is born. Their study also suggests that the
wife may be substituting more say in child-rearing for private consumption.2
This study is related to Blundell, Chiappori, and Meghir (2005) in the sense
that both studies deal with the intra-household resource allocation in the presence
of public goods. However, the purpose of this note is not to identify the sharing rule
but to provide an analytical framework that allows us to identify the factors that
aect the Pareto weight. This study is also dierent from Browning, Chiappori, and
Lewbel (2010), who propose a way to estimate the indierence scales in a collective
household, because we do not try to compare the welfare levels of individuals in
dierent types of households.
In the next section, we formalize the intra-household allocation problem and
derive the main results. Section 3 concludes.
1 Using experimental data, Bruyneel, Cherchye, and Rock (2012) nd that their collective
model outperforms the unitary model in terms of `predictive success,' which simultaneously
accounts for the goodness-of-t and discriminatory power of a particular model specication.
2 A related study is Peters (2011), who nds that access to family planning and maternal
and child health services has a positive eect on female bargaining power in the household in
Bangladesh. Because she only uses the ability to make certain purchases without permission
as a measure of female bargaining power, her results may not be applicable to the outcome of
bargaining (i.e., intrahousehold allocation of resources).
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2 Main results
We consider a collective model for a household, which consists of a husband h,
a wife w and possibly children and other household members. There are i pri-
vate goods and c public goods in the economy. The total number of goods in the
economy is n  i+ c. Private goods are enjoyed either by the husband or by the
wife, whereas the public goods are enjoyed in common. Public goods may include
those goods consumed by the children and other household members, because the
husband and the wife care about their consumption or welfare.3
Let Ri+ and Rc+ be the consumption sets of private and public goods, respec-
tively, for a household. Further, we let Y be the household income and p 2 (Rn++)
the price vector of the n goods, respectively, where() is a unit simplex for a set .
With some slight abuse of notation, we denote by pi and pc the price vectors of
private and public goods, respectively, with p = (pi; pc) = (p1; : : : ; pi; pi+1; : : : ; pn).
Similarly, we denote the index sets of private and public goods by Ii  f1; : : : ; ig
and Ic  fi+ 1; : : : ; ng, respectively.
Each member m 2 fw; hg has a cardinal utility function Um : Ri+ Rc+ ! R+,
which is strictly increasing, strictly concave, and twice continuously dierentiable
on Rn+. As with Blundell, Chiappori, and Meghir (2005), we assume that the allo-
cation is Pareto-ecient for the husband and wife. Then, for any Pareto-ecient
allocation (~xw; ~xh; ~xc), there exists a unique household Pareto weight  2 [0; 1] such
that (~xw; ~xh; ~xc) is supported as follows:4
(~xw; ~xh; ~xc) = argmax
(xw;xh;xc)
Uw(xw; xc) + (1  )Uh(xh; xc)
s.t. pi(xw + xh) + pcxc  Y:
(1)
The household Pareto weight  reects the wife's overall decision power and sum-
marizes how the resources are allocated within the household. In what follows, we
shall exclude the degenerate cases where  2 f0; 1g because they are in eect cases
of a single decision-maker.
We shall hereafter maintain the weak separability5 of Im from Ic in Um. For-
mally, for any j; k 2 Im and any l 2 Ic,
@
@xcl

@Um=@xmj
@Um=@xmk

= 0;
where xmj and x
m
k are the j-th and k-th components of the vector of m's private
goods consumption xm 2 Ri+, and xcl is the l-th component of the vector of public
3 One can think of \private" and \public" simply as labels and adopt an alternative clas-
sication. As long as the weak separability assumption discussed below is maintained, the
main points of this paper hold without any modication under the alternative classication.
However, because the primary example of the application of this study is childbirth, we only
consider the classication of private and public goods in this paper.
4 We use parentheses and square brackets and to denote open and closed intervals, respec-
tively. Therefore, [0; 1] denotes a unit interval including both ends (i.e., 0 and 1), whereas (0; 1)
excludes them.
5 The separability condition is often useful for obtaining the identication of the sharing
rule Blundell, Chiappori, and Meghir (2005); Browning, Chiappori, and Lechene (2006), even
though it is not always necessary. Blundell and Robin (2000) provide a generalization of weak
separability. Thomas (1990) provides an empirical application of weak separability to intra-
household resource allocation.
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goods consumption xc 2 Rc+. The weak separability condition states that the
marginal rate of substitution between any two private goods does not depend on
the level of public goods consumption.
The weak separability assumption necessarily holds if the household budget
is allocated in two stages. In the rst stage, the total budget is split into private
goods expenditure and public goods expenditure. Then, the bundle of private
[public] goods to be consumed is determined solely by the private [public] goods
expenditure and private [public] goods prices. For the Japanese households, the
separability assumption was not rejected under a few alternative denitions of
private and public goods (Fujii and Ishikawa, 2012).
Given the weak separability condition, there exist continuous, strictly increas-
ing, and strictly quasi-concave functions um and Um such that Um(xm; xc) =
Um(um(xm); xc).6 We call um the private sub-utility function because it repre-
sents the utility that the member m derives from his private goods consumption.
Under the weak separability condition, the maximization problem Eq. (1) can be
written as follows:
max
(xw;xh;xc)
Uw(uw(xw); xc) + (1  ) Uh(uh(xh); xc)
s.t. pi(xw + xh) + pcxc  Y:
(2)
Let us denote the maximand of Eq. (2) by W(x
w; xh; xc). Then, it can be shown
that W(x
w; xh; xc) is continuous, strictly increasing, and strictly quasi-concave.
Further, for the j-th and k-th components in any xm 2 Ri+ and the l-th component
in any xc 2 Rc+, the following holds:
@
@xcl

@W=@x
m
j
@W=@x
m
k

=
@
@xcl

@Um=@xmj
@Um=@xmk

=
@
@xcl

@um=@xmj
@um=@xmk

= 0:
The following proposition follows directly from this equation and the denition of
weak separability:
Proposition 1 For m 2 fh;wg, Im is weakly separable from Ic in W.
Proposition 1 states that weak separability at the individual level is preserved in
the household utility function W.
7 This suggests that we can follow the changes
in the resource allocation within the household by looking at the space of pri-
vate goods. Let us now formally dene the private sub-problem for the household
problem Eq. (1) as follows:
Denition 1 (Private sub-problem) Suppose that the allocation (~xw; ~xh; ~xc) is
Pareto-ecient. The problem (uw; uh; y; ) is called the private sub-problem of the
household problem (Uw; Uh;Y; ) if (~xw; ~xh) is supported in the following problem:
(~xw; ~xh) = argmax
(xw;xh)
uw(xw) + (1  )uh(xh) s.t. pi(xw + xh)  y;
where y( Y ) is the private-good expenditure and  2 (0; 1) is the private Pareto
weight.
6 See Theorem 3.3b in Blackorby, Primont, and Russell (1978).
7 Notice, however, that Iw [ Ih is not necessarily weakly separable from Ic. We do not need
such a condition for our purpose.
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It can be shown that the private sub-problem exists under Pareto eciency and
the weak separability conditions.
Theorem 1 Suppose that (~xw; ~xh; ~xc) maximizes the maximand W in Eq. (2). Then,
a private sub-problem (uw; uh; y; ) exists.
Proof: Consider a Pareto ecient allocation (~xw; ~xh; ~xc). This allocation must
satisfy the rst-order conditions of the maximization problem in Eq. (2). Hence,
with some slight abuse of notation, we have the following for m 2 fw; hg and any
l1; l2; l3; l4 2 Ii:
@ Um
@um
@um
@xml1
,
@ Um
@um
@um
@xml2
=
@um
@xml1
@um
@xml2
=
pil1
pil2
; (3)

@ Uw
@uw
@uw
@xwl3
(1  )@
Uh
@uh
@uh
@xhl4
=
pil3
pil4
: (4)
This follows from the weak separability of W.
Now, let us denote the marginal utility from the private sub-utility evaluated at
(~xm; ~xc) by m  @ Um=@um

(xm;xc)=(~xm;~xc)
for m 2 fh;wg. Further, let w  w
and h  (1  )h, and set  = w
w+h
and y = pi(~xw + ~xh). It is straightforward
to verify that the rst order conditions for the private sub-problem coincide with
Eq. (3) and Eq. (4). Since um is strictly concave, the solution to the rst-order
conditions corresponds to the unique allocation in (uw; uh; y; ). This proves the
existence of the private sub-problem. ut
Theorem 1 suggests that we can potentially track the changes of resource allo-
cation within the household by focusing on the space of the private sub-problem.
In general, however, the relationship between the household Pareto weight  and
the private Pareto weight  may not be monotonic. It turns out that the following
condition on the elasticity  of the ratio   w=h of marginal utilities with
respect to  is important to ensure that  and  move in the same direction.
EL: The elasticity    =  @=@ satises  >  (1   ) 1 for any  2 (0; 1),
Y 2 R+ and p 2 (Rn++).
Note that m is a function of Y , p and , because ~xw, ~xh and ~xc are functions of
Y , p and .
When  increases, the wife's sub-utility increases while the husband's decreases.
Then,  decreases because m and um tend to move in the opposite direction.
Assumption EL requires that the proportional change in  be suciently small
in absolute terms relative to the proportional change in . While Assumption EL
cannot be tested, it is violated only if  <  1. That is, it cannot be violated
provided the proportional changes in  exceed those in  in absolute terms. Under
Assumption EL, the private Pareto weight  moves in the same direction as the
household Pareto weight  as shown in the following theorem.
Theorem 2 @=@ > 0 holds if and only if EL holds.
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Proof: We use the notations in the proof of Theorem 1. Then,
@
@
=
w 
h   hw
(w + h)2
=
wh
(w + h)2

1 + (1  )

w
w
  
h

h

=
wh
(w + h)2
(1 + (1  )) :
Because h, w, and 1  are all positive, @@ > 0 holds if and only if  >  (1 ) 1.
ut
As is clear from the construction of  in the proof of Theorem 1,  is a function
of p, Y and . Theorem 2 shows that after controlling for the changes in p and Y
we only need to examine the changes in the private Pareto weight  in order to
follow those in the household Pareto weight .
3 Conclusion
We have shown that the allocation of private goods in any Pareto-ecient allo-
cation in a household can be represented as a Pareto-ecient allocation in the
private sub-problem. This result follows from the weak separability assumption.
While a similar result is presented in Blundell, Chiappori, and Meghir (2005), they
treat the private and public goods as a Hicksian composite good. As discussed in
Hicks (1946, p.33), a sucient condition for the existence of a Hicksian composite
good is that the relative prices of all the component goods are constant, which
is highly restrictive.8 Without making such a restrictive assumption, we derive
the relationship between the household and private Pareto weights and provide a
meaningful interpretation of the private Pareto weight under Assumption EL.
Our results are useful for analyzing the intrahousehold resource allocation when
total individual private consumption data are available. Using the model presented
here, Fujii and Ishikawa (2012) analyzed the impact of childbirth on intrahouse-
hold resource allocation in Japan using the JPSC data that include the total pri-
vate consumption expenditures. While the availability of total individual private
consumption data is currently limited, a number of interesting studies on intra-
household resource allocation could be generated using our analytical framework
when more data become available.
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